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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
This study on China’s relations with Brazil and Argentina, as 
well as its implications for U.S. concerns examines two main 
questions: Why China’s increasing influence on Brazil and 
Argentina may be considered a cause for U.S. security 
concerns? And if this is the case, how do China’s strategic 
alliances with the two countries has impacted U.S. 
leadership? In an effort to look at China’s influence from 
multidimensional angles and beyond China’s visible 
economic influence in these two countries, this paper argues 
that China’s interest in the Latin American region, with a 
focus on Brazil and Argentina, responds to a more crafted, 
pragmatic and tailored vision with long-term strategic and 
political goals.  
 
The results of this study reveal that China ―avoiding intra-
regional competition through a strategic diversification of 
sectors― has been able to secure critical resources for its 
population as well as promote enduring alliances in the 
region that could represent a plausible cause of concern for 
U.S. interests. In this regard, China’s avoidance of a direct 
challenge to traditional partners’ influence has responded to 
the gaps left by a gradual, but steady lack of U.S. 
involvement.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Why China’s increasing influence on Brazil and Argentina 
may be considered a cause for U.S. security concerns? If so, 
how do China’s strategic alliances with the two countries has 
impacted U.S. leadership? This paper argues that China’s 
footprint needs to be looked upon from multidimensional 
angles. It also calls for the need to examine these 
relationships beyond the more visible China’s economic 
influence that respond to a cross-regional quest for survival 
in a globalized market, with aggressive investments in 
commodities, mining, infrastructure, and energy sectors.  
 
It has been often noted that China’s influence in the region 
has responded to the gaps left by a gradual but steady lack of 
U.S. involvement during the last decade. Worth noting is that 
Argentina and Brazil have obtained advantages in the 
relationship with China. In the case of Argentina, the 
relationship has been focused on the promotion of long-term 
economic investments as a key commodities’ supplier while 
Brazil has benefitted from a more enduring strategic alliance, 
as a global oil supplier as well as from military agreements 
reached with China.   
 
Furthermore, China’s interest in Latin America, primarily on 
Brazil and Argentina, responds to a more pragmatic, crafted, 
and tailored vision that has political and strategic goals. This 
vision, that seeks to avoid direct competitive confrontation 
with the U.S., and to diversify sectors, has been oriented to 
assuring less-intra region competition. Hence, targeted 
investment strategies have been identified for each of the 
countries involved to foster bilateral relations instead of 
promoting a grand strategy of economic investments in the 
region. In this way, each country negotiates directly with the 
Chinese government according to the commodities, 
manufacturing, or services it is best positioned to offer.  
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The paper illustrates this theoretical framework with 
evidence from Brazil and Argentina, with a special focus on 
the implications of China’s relationship with both countries, 
as well as how they represent or not, a reason for concern for 
U.S. interests. This qualitative and comparative analysis 
gathers data from national agencies of the countries under 
study; as well as from articles, reports, and available data in 
international organizations.   
 
THE REDESIGN OF INTERCONNECTEDNESS: U.S. 
AND CHINA’S INFLUENCE IN LATIN AMERICA 
 
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union opened new topics for discussion that continue to 
puzzle analysts even today. During the last years of the 
twentieth century, numerous forecasts were made regarding 
the international system and the behavior of the main actors 
on the global scene.  
 
As an emerging power, the People’s Republic of China 
began to perceive how the international system initiated a 
transition process toward a multi-polar structure of power, in 
which the main powers exerted their levels of influence 
according to their respective areas of interests.   
 
The new reality shifted completely away from what had been 
deemed the norm by the end of World War II, when a strict 
bipolar structure of power fostered strategic stability. Such 
bipolarity has now disappeared. Today’s world is a multi-
polar and interconnected arena in which economic 
competition has turned volatile, uncertain, and fierce. 
Currently, States compete for commodities and services 
available in the global market, and struggle to compete 
internationally by placing their products in different markets. 
At the same time, a combination of interests has steadily 
increased the strategic worth of certain products considered 
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of importance from an economic, political, and defense 
perspective. 
 
When examining a country like China, and the dramatic pace 
of its economic upsurge, it is impossible to overlook its 
economic milestones. A recent report from the Brookings 
Institution citing an International Monetary Fund report 
highlights the fact that China will soon become the world’s 
largest economy, making the United States the second 
world’s economy.1 Of particular interest is the fact that 
China was, in the mid-twentieth century, a poor country; 
consequently, its economic and political development took 
place in only half a century. Although Richard Bush notes in 
that report that it remains unclear as to when China will 
surpass the United States in terms of economic performance, 
the trend indicates that this situation (as measured by the 
gross domestic product) could take place in the next few 
years.
2
 
 
CHINA’S STRATEGY TOWARD ARGENTINA 
 
The People’s Republic of China has shown preference for 
the Asian region and for countries that share its external 
interests. Yet, China’s interests have increasingly turned to 
Latin American countries, which now occupy a strong 
secondary place in Beijing’s areas of interest. As noted by 
Mauricio Cardenas, China has shown a strategic interest in 
the Latin American region at the same time that the United 
States has been losing its influence.
3
 Cardenas highlights the 
                                                 
1
 Richard C. Bush III, ―As Number One, China to Face Hour of Choice,‖ 
Brookings Institution, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, June 30 
2011,  
http://www.brookingstsinghua.cn/sitecore/content/Home/opinions/2011/0
630_china_bush.aspx. 
2
 Ibid. 
3
 Mauricio Cárdenas, "Think Again: Latin America," Foreign Policy, 
March 17, 2011, page 2.  
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fact that China is now Brazil’s and Chile’s principal trading 
partner. In the last two years (2009-2010), China’s 
Development Bank (CDB) signed agreements (generally 
loans-for-oil agreements) to lend $35 billion to countries in 
Latin America, including Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Ecuador, and Venezuela.
4
 On the other hand, it is also worth 
noting that Latin American countries, especially the larger 
markets in Argentina and Brazil, continue to be of interest 
for the United States. Cardenas emphasizes that despite 
having only 40 percent of China’s population, the region’s 
―average per capita income is twice that of China’s.‖5 
Bearing this in mind, the China has been looking to a wide 
array of strategies to strengthen its presence in the region by 
pursuing economic, political, and cultural approaches. 
 
Latin America’s relationships with China have stemmed 
from a new world of interconnectedness and a strategy 
designed to diversify their leverage in world affairs.
6
  Under 
Mao Tse-Tung, China followed a policy of international 
isolation – especially in the political realm-, with the 
assumption that China did not fall under ―the norms and 
regulations of the international relations that defined 
occidental powers.‖7 Subsequent reforms by Deng Xiaoping 
followed, with an open policy carried out by Jiang Zemin 
and the current government of Hu Jintao.
8
 This evolution 
toward the opening to global markets has significantly 
impacted China’s economic development as well as 
                                                 
4
 Cárdenas, ―Think Again,‖ 2. 
5
 Ibid. 
6
 David Shambaugh, ―China’s New Foray into Latin America,‖ 
Brookings Institution, November  17, 2008, 
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/1117_china_shambaugh.aspx  
(Accessed on July 3, 2011). 
7
 Fisac, Taciana, and Steve Tsang.                                
                            . (Santiago: Ediciones Bellaterra, 2000), 
416. 
8
 Ibid, 415 
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contributed to soundly positioning the country as a global 
emerging power.  
 
China’s approaches often take advantage of the loopholes 
left by the United States in Latin America—especially 
during recent years, when international threats in other 
regions have captivated most of the United States’ attention 
in regard to defense of its national interests. For example, in 
the case of the Argentine government, the governments of 
both President Nestor Kirchner (2003-2007) and his 
successor, wife, and widow Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner 
(2007-2011) made an ideological turn to the ―new left‖ that 
guided not only national but also foreign policy as well as 
how strategic alliances are identified, strengthened, or 
dismissed in the international system. As a result, China 
found itself, with a friendly political-ideological scenario. 
Thus, from the Chinese foreign policy’s viewpoint, the ―anti-
American spirit‖ of the Argentine government (revived from 
the Peronists’ nationalism of the 1970s and the Montoneros’ 
guerrilla ideology) has, over the last decades, shaped public 
opinion with a favorable environment for the containment of 
a worldwide hegemonic policy of the United States, to China 
is opposed as a basic principle of its foreign policy.
9
 
 
Since 2003, the Kirchners’ government—in clear opposition 
to previous Argentinean governments that were aligned with 
the United States, has shown that ideology prevails in the 
process of decision making. Indeed, President Fernandez has 
been extremely critical of the United States’ economic 
policy, and has emphasized her country’s ability to withstand 
the economic whirlwind initiated in the United States in 
2008. Hence, to a great extent, the political space that China 
finds in Argentina is the result of the policies and ideological 
stance of the last two Argentine administrations (Justicialista 
                                                 
9
 Sheng Hu, Breve Historia del Partido Comunista de China, (Beijing: 
Ediciones en Lenguas Extranjeras, 1994).  
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Party) and to a lesser extent, the limited credit that the 
United States grants Argentina in regard to its relative 
influence in the American sub-continent.  
 
In the case of China, it has reached consistency between its 
internal economic reform processes, the opening up of the 
Chinese government, which has defined a set of geographical 
and strategic priorities that include the access to 
commodities and energetic resources, as well as relations 
with Taiwan.  In this context, China’s relations with 
Argentina are oriented to further develop some of the 
mentioned objectives. In the political realm, China aims to 
consolidate its position of ―One China‖ and that of Taiwan 
as an inalienable part of the Asian country. In this regard, 
Argentina has opposed Taiwan’s attempts to gain admission 
in international organizations such as the United Nations, the 
Organization of American States and the World Health 
Organization, all forums in which Argentina has adopted an 
active and unequivocal position in support of the principle of 
―One China.‖ 
 
In addition, the Argentine government recognizes Tibet as 
having been integrated into the territory of the People’s 
Republic of China. In turn, Argentina has obtained China’s 
support for its claim on sovereignty of the Falkland Islands’ 
(Islas Malvinas) and in its quest for a permanent membership 
at the UN Security Council. Furthermore, Argentina has 
consistently opted for abstaining on votes dealing with 
China’s human rights situations. China’s strengthened 
relations with Argentina and Brazil, as founding members of 
MERCOSUR, further serve the needs of the Chinese 
government to pressure other countries in the region political 
and economically, including Paraguay, who is the only 
member of the economic bloc that maintains diplomatic 
relations with Taiwan.  
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Regarding defense and military policy, the opening of the 
Argentine military market to Chinese products is still 
inchoate, primarily due to the fact that Argentina’s armed 
forces remain the privileged historical benefactor of 
armaments from Europe and the United States.  Also, both 
Kirchner administrations have promoted the development of 
a national defense industry.
10
 Yet some rapprochements and 
discussion between national officials related to logistics have 
promoted the advancement of military agreements between 
Beijing and Buenos Aires, including Argentina’s testing of 
certain Chinese vehicles (trucks for civil and military use) 
and dual-use helicopters.
11
 Other types of exchanges have 
included visits of high-ranking military officers and 
provision of training courses aimed at fostering ties and 
cooperation between the two military.  
 
Argentina’s military relations with China were strengthened 
by the visit of then-Minister of Defense Nilda Garre to China 
in 2007.  Following the visit, the two countries signed the 
first military cooperation agreement of cooperation in the 
area of defense. This visit was particularly noteworthy in that 
several previous invitations extended to Argentina’s Minister 
of Defense had been postponed for various reasons. The 
document signed Beijing in 2007 set the stage for ―carry[ing] 
out contacts in communications, personnel visits in all areas, 
                                                 
10
 The Kirchner couple have attempted to engage in a ―limited‖ process 
of import substitution industrialization in this sector, as a way to counter 
the country’s dependence to foreign imports by focusing on not only the 
exports of commodities, but also the creation of heavy manufacturing to 
supply the country’s needs.  
11
 Ministerio de Defensa de la Republica Argentina, ―Argentina y China 
firmaron acuerdo de cooperación militar,‖ 5/16/2007,  Información de 
Prensa  Nº 116/07, 
http://www.mindef.gov.ar/info.asp?Id=393&bus=1&comboN=titulo&crit
erioN=china&vDiaN=&vMesN=&vAnioN= (Accessed on July 27, 2011) 
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exchange of logistics and military equipment, and training of 
personnel for peace-keeping operations.‖12 
 
In sheer commercial terms, Roberto Russell notes in a 
Foreign Affairs article that the rise of Asia, including China 
and India, at the end of the nineteenth and in the early 
twentieth century, offered Argentina a good possibility to 
move away from a decade of isolation from international 
markets and resume a significant role in international 
markets.
13
 Yet, the fact that Argentina is still struggling to 
become a solid international player after the much publicized 
2001 economic crisis, embarking on cooperative relations 
with non-U.S.-friendly partners such as Venezuela’s Hugo 
Chavez and continuously attempting to move further from 
U.S. influence (thus sustaining a non-depreciable anti-
American sentiment), sets the stage for a wait-and-see 
scenario in U.S.-Argentine relations. In this regard, Russell 
underscores how Argentina is viewed by Washington with a 
sentiment of distrust and ambiguity, with an uncertain 
political and economic model.
14
 Meanwhile, recent Sino-
Argentine relations constructed primarily upon mutual 
economic needs (e.g., the provision of commodities by 
Argentina and prominent economic investments by China) 
could subsequently serve to ensure a broader international 
role for Argentina.  
 
 
                                                 
12
 Ministerio de Defensa de la República Argentina, 
http://www.mindef.gov.ar/comunicacion_gacetillas.asp?eje=30&page=5
&bus=3&comboN=&criterioN=&vDiaN=&vMesN=&vAnioN=, 
(Accessed on July 9, 2011).  
13
 Roberto Russell, ―La relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos,‖ Foreign 
Affairs Latinoamérica, 8.4 (2008): 92-98, 
http://fal.itam.mx/descargas/fal_octubre_2008/15_Roberto_Russell.pdf 
(Accessed on July 11, 2011)  
14
 Ibid 
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CHINA AND BRAZIL: PERSPECTIVES OF AN 
ENDURING STRATEGIC ALLIANCE 
 
In a comparative regional assessment, the relationship 
between Brazil and China has a completely different 
dimension from that of Argentina and China. The fact that 
Brazil has emerged during the last decade as a hemispheric 
power and is now considered the eight economy of the 
world, exerting influence not only in the Americas, but also 
at the global level, has put the Sino-Brazilian relationship at 
a different level. Brazil has strengthened economic ties with 
China through full-fledged trade on several commodities, as 
well as on manufactured products and technology.  
 
Brazil’s behavior in the region has often been considered 
―different‖ by its neighbors in Latin America. The country 
has largely sought different markets to expand its economy, 
often turning it back on its counterparts in the region while 
preferring to deal with other regions, such as Asia and 
Europe. Itamaraty
15
 has often displayed its diplomacy 
independently from the Latin American bloc, thus provoking 
distrust within the region. Its Latin American neighbors have 
often found that Brazil’s attitude does not contribute to 
regional efforts to advance common economic goals as a 
bloc.
16
  
 
In recent years, both under President Luiz Ignacio ―Lula‖ da 
Silva, and more recently, the administration of Dilma 
Rousseff, Brazil has broadened its military agreements with 
                                                 
15
 Itamaraty is the name given to the Brazilian Foreign Ministry. 
16
 See Roberto Russell and Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, ―Percepciones 
Argentinas de Brasil: Ambivalencias y Expectativas,‖ Plataforma 
Democrática, Working Paper N 19, July 2011, 8, 
http://www.plataformademocratica.org/Arquivos/Plataforma_Democratic
a_Working_Paper_19_2011_Espanhol.pdf (Accessed on September 5, 
2011) 
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China.
17
 As a result of diverse cooperative agreements, 
Brazil has been very appealing for Chinese objectives in the 
region, fostering the opening of a plausible enduring, 
cooperative, and strategic alliance with an emerging power 
to secure its internal needs as well as compete in the global 
market, principles that constitute a cornerstone of its foreign 
policy. With 190 million inhabitants, Brazil is the most 
resource-rich country of Latin America and has steadily 
consolidated its influence over the rest of the countries at the 
regional level over the last few years—to the point that the 
country can be arguably defined as a ―primus inter pares.‖18  
 
China’s political and military presence in Brazil has been 
continuously growing, and its leverage and presence in 
Brazil are more notable than in the case of neighboring 
Argentina. David Shambaugh, at the Brookings Institute, 
notes that China provides military training to Latin American 
officers and sells military arms to countries in the region, 
including ―helicopters, artillery, anti-air and anti-ship 
missiles and light assault weapons, while buying anti-tank, 
anti-air missiles and avionics from Brazil.‖19  
 
The Brazilian model has developed steadily as a result of the 
economic reforms of the 1990s, the consolidation of 
democratic institutions, and effective public policies in 
                                                 
17
 Government of Brazil, ―Agreements between the Government of the 
Federative Republic of Brazil and the Government of the People’s 
Republic of China,‖ Portal Brasil, 04/12/2011, 
http://www.brasil.gov.br/news/history/2011/04-1/12/agreements-
between-the-government-of-the-federative-republic-of-brazil-and-the-
government-of-the-people2019s-republic-of-china (Accessed on August, 
3, 2011) 
18
 The Oxford Dictionaries defines primus inter pares as ―a first among 
equals,‖ Oxford Dictionaries, 
http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/primus+inter+pares?region=us 
(Accessed on July 4, 2011) 
19
 Shambaugh, ―China’s New Foray,‖ page 1. 
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national and foreign policy.
20
 Ricardo Sennes notes in a 2008 
article that Brazil’s economic stability, the reassurance of the 
credit and capital markets, and improved economic growth 
has played a role in the ―internationalization of the economy 
of Brazil.‖21  
 
When analyzing the political dimensions of China’s 
relationship with Brazil and implications for the United 
States, it is important not to overlook the differences that 
exist between Brazil and China in terms of their domestic 
institutions. Brazilian experts Carlos Pereira and Augusto de 
Castro Neves recently noted in their Brookings Institution’s 
policy paper that contrasts between both emerging powers 
are highly visible: whereas Brazil is a democratic market 
economy, China is a ―predominantly planned economy ruled 
by an authoritarian regime.‖22 From a geopolitical point of 
view of south-south relations, Brazil and China have more 
coincidences than disagreements in cross-regional and 
international issues, which are reflected and strengthened in 
international forums such as the G-20 meeting and the 
international summits of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, 
China, and South Africa). However, despite such 
international attempts for cooperation, national interests still 
prevail in the strategic pursuits of both countries.  
 
Sennes underscores from an economic perspective that 
Brazil’s relations with non-traditional partners (such as 
China and some African countries) as well as traditional ones 
                                                 
20
 Ricardo Sennes, ―Las relaciones Brasil-Estados Unidos: Un Acuerdo 
Tácito,‖ Foreign Affairs Latinoamérica, 2008, 
http://fal.itam.mx/descargas/fal_octubre_2008/14_Ricardo_Sennes.pdf 
(Accessed on July 13, 2011). 
21
 Sennes, ―Las relaciones,‖ p. 1. 
22
 Carlos Pereira and Joao Augusto de Castro Neves, ―Brazil and China; 
South-South Partnership  or North-South Competition?‖ Policy Paper 
No. 26, March 2011, Foreign Policy at Brookings, Washington, DC., 
page 2.  
13 
 
(regional partners and European countries) have influenced 
the reduction of relative leverage of the United States over 
the last decade.
23
 Yet, the United States continues to be a 
relevant commercial partner of Brazil, especially in regards 
to services, innovation, and energy sectors.
24
 
 
Finally, the evidence of the growing commitments between 
both countries confirm the assumption that China has cast its 
eyes on Brazil in the quest for an enduring strategic alliance, 
understanding that Brazil is a prosperous country with a 
technologically driven process of modernization that drives it 
to play the role of a key actor with a major influence in both 
the international and regional scenes.  
 
CONCLUSIONS: CHINA’S INVOLVEMENT AND U.S. 
SECURITY CONCERNS 
 
This paper has sought to examine China’s growing interest in 
Latin America, with a special focus on Argentina and Brazil. 
As it has been noted, China’s involvement in the region has 
been carefully tailored to the specific needs of each of the 
two countries under study, basically encountering clear 
asymmetries in the kinds of alliances currently being drawn 
in the region. China has aggressively invested in both 
countries. Its relations with Argentina seem to be more 
economically driven, with the former securing a long-term 
provision of commodities for its growing population.  
 
On the other hand, China’s relationship with Brazil has many 
edges that need to be examined from a multidimensional 
perspective, as many areas have and are being developed, 
especially in the commodities, oil, technological, and 
military sectors. Nevertheless, an important question 
remains: Does China’s involvement represent a growing 
                                                 
23
 Sennes, ―Las relaciones,‖ page 2. 
24
 Ibid, 7 
14 
 
security concern for the United States? At this point, it looks 
like China’s steady involvement in the region is definitely a 
cause for concern for the United States. China has opened 
the space in the region, effectively taking advantages of 
those left open by the United States.  Until the United States 
resumes a larger role in the region—if it ever does—
developments will remain unclear.  
 
Furthermore, a stubborn economic crisis, an uncertain global 
market, and military challenges overseas have been key 
factors that have pushed the United States to temporarily 
abandon its interests in the region, especially in Brazil and 
Argentina. In turn, these two countries have attempted to 
initiate and secure relations with other non-traditional 
partners, especially China. However, recent caveats on Latin 
American countries’ dependence on the Chinese economy 
could be severely affected by a slowdown of the Chinese 
economy, severely impacting Brazil’s and Argentina’s 
commodities’ sector.25  
 
China’s initial footprint in these two countries has been 
widely considered economically driven. Yet the evidence 
suggests that this involvement responds to a much more 
crafted political and strategic vision, especially in the case of 
Brazil. Indeed, China has been extremely careful in avoiding 
intra-regional conflict by diversifying its areas of interests, as 
                                                 
25
 Pereira and Castro Neves noted how China’s involvement strategy in 
Brazil, is causing some reason for concern on security issues. Restrictive 
measures carried out by Brazilian ministries are being designed to control 
Chinese investments in land purchases. As the authors highlight, these 
acquisitions (by China’s state-owned enterprises) are thought to have 
possible negative impacts on security issues as well as land sovereignty 
and commodity prices. Some critics have also argued that China is taking 
advantage of Brazilian military technology, as evident in the recent 
decision to close Brazilian Embraer’s plant in China and embark on the 
construction of Brazilian-like aircrafts. See Pereira and Castro Neves, 
―Brazil and China,‖ page 6. 
15 
 
evident in the cases of Argentina and Brazil. In addition, it 
has largely avoided directly challenging American influence 
in the region.  In this sense, China has moved away from 
engaging in security issues, such as the control of terrorism, 
drug wars, and the rise of civil guerrillas, especially in 
Central American countries and Mexico.  
 
Finally, American security concerns regarding Chinese 
involvement with Brazil and Argentina should not to be 
overlooked. Brazil has consolidated its democratic 
institutions over the last decade and pursued a market 
democracy, and Itamaraty has been an active and sometimes 
unpredictable player in global diplomacy, with critical 
leverage in international forums that may challenge 
American security concerns—especially regarding relations 
with countries that maintain a tense relation with 
Washington. In this sense, a more solid cross-regional 
strategic alliance with China could be perceived as 
potentially harmful for American security interests in the 
global system. In the case of Argentina, these possibilities 
are much more limited, but also warrant further attention.  
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